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Abstract
This article provides a critical review of the evidence on ‘thinking and working politically’ (TWP) in development. Scholars
and practitioners have increasingly recognised that development is a fundamentally political process, and there are con-
certed efforts underway to develop more politically-informed and adaptive ways of thinking and working in providing de-
velopment assistance. However, while there are interesting and engaging case studies in the emerging, largely practitioner-
based literature, these do not yet constitute a strong evidence base that shows these efforts can be clearly linked to more
effective aid programming. Much of the evidence used so far to support these approaches is anecdotal, does not meet
high standards for a robust body of evidence, is not comparative and draws on a small number of self-selected, relatively
well-known success stories written primarily by programme insiders. The article discusses the factors identified in the TWP
literature that are said to enable politically-informed programmes to increase aid effectiveness. It then looks at the state of
the evidence on TWP in three areas: political context, sector, and organisation. The aim is to show where research efforts
have been targeted so far and to provide guidance on where the field might focus next. In the final section, the article
outlines some ways of testing the core assumptions of the TWP agenda more thoroughly, to provide a clearer sense of the
contribution it can make to aid effectiveness.
Keywords
aid effectiveness; development assistance; donors; evidence; governance; politics; thinking and working politically
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Aid Impact and Effectiveness”, edited by Rachel M. Gisselquist and Finn Tarp (UNU-WIDER,
Finland).
© 2019 by UNU-WIDER; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
A long-standing criticism of development assistance has
been its technocratic focus. This technocratic approach
can be traced back to the origins of modern develop-
ment assistance after the Second World War, which
was in part based on the belief that ‘underdevelop-
ment is a function of a lack of resources—usually fi-
nancial, but also technical or human—and that this can
be tackled with a sufficient infusion of capital’ (Hudson
& Dasandi, 2014, p. 239). However, the growing focus
on aid effectiveness—or more specifically, the lack of
aid effectiveness (see Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007;
Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009; Tarp & Hansen, 2003)—
has led to criticisms of the failure of aid donors to en-
gage with the inherently political nature of the devel-
opment process, criticisms that have come from various
sources over an almost thirty year period (e.g. Easterly,
2006; Ferguson, 1990; Leftwich, 2000; Unsworth, 2009).
From this perspective, the persistence of poor policies
andweak institutions is believed to have less to dowith a
lack of knowledge or finance and more to do with the ac-
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tions of powerful actors, groups or collectivemovements
who gain from existing arrangements and resist change
(Leftwich, 2000).
Over the past two decades, in a bid to improve
aid effectiveness, major donors have sought to engage
more explicitly with the politics of the contexts in which
they operate (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). This
turn to politics by aid donors and other development
organizations—which is discussed in detail by Carothers
and de Gramont (2013)—has been labelled ‘thinking and
working politically’ or ‘TWP’. As Teskey (2017) points out,
the exact origin of the phrase ‘thinking and working po-
litically’ is uncertain. The first formal academic reference
seems to be in Leftwich (2011), but there are internal De-
partment for International Development (DFID) notes go-
ing back at least to the early 2000s that reference the key
ideas (see e.g., Pycroft, 2006, 2010).1 While there is no
single agreed definition, framework or set of formal tools
for ‘TWP’, three potentially core principles of TWP have
been set out: a) strong political analysis, insight and un-
derstanding; b) a detailed appreciation of, and response
to, the local context; and c) flexibility and adaptability in
program design and implementation (TWP Community
of Practice, 2013).
In recent years, there has been a notable increase
in aid programmes that explicitly reference TWP and/or
what are said to be similar ideas such as ‘Doing Develop-
ment Differently’ (DDD), problem-driven iterative adap-
tation (PDIA) and adaptive management.2 DFID’s recent
review of their efforts to integrate politics into program-
ming, for example, highlighted the organisation’s com-
mitment to this way of working (Piron, Baker, Savage, &
Wiseman, 2016), and it remains at the heart of its ap-
proach to governance programming. The focus on poli-
tics and power in the 2017 World Development Report
(World Bank, 2017) and the introduction of applied polit-
ical economy analysis (PEA) in USAIDmissions since 2014
(Garber, 2014; RochaMenocal et al., 2018) are further ex-
amples of the growing interest in TWP in other donors.
Scholars have advocated for greater flexibility, learn-
ing from failure and paying attention to political context
in aid programmes since at least the 1960s (Carothers
& de Gramont, 2013), while calls to adopt a more adap-
tive, locally-led approach also have a strong precedent
in development theory, with a particular group of au-
thors in the 1980s championing this philosophy (Korten,
1980; Rondinelli, 1983; Therkildsen, 1988). While ‘TWP’
does not therefore describe an entirely new set of ideas
or methods, it is nevertheless clear that we are wit-
nessing an unprecedented level of interest in engaging
with power and politics in development organisations.
An international TWP Community of Practice3—bringing
together leading experts from donor agencies, NGOs,
the private sector, think tanks and academia—has been
meeting periodically since late 2013, with a ‘sister’ DDD
group meeting periodically since 2014.4 Several case
studies have been published (discussed in more detail
below). However, despite this growing interest in TWP
among development organisations, a crucial issue that
has received less attention is the extent to which adopt-
ing the ideas and practices associatedwith TWPhave suc-
ceeded in improving the effectiveness of development
programmes. In other words, does the existing evidence
suggest that TWP has led to increased aid effectiveness?
This article considers this question by reviewing the
current evidence base on TWP to better understand its
contribution to the aid effectiveness agenda in order
to inform discussions around what may constitute good
practice and what future evidence needs may be. In part
it uses the framework suggested by Dasandi, Marquette
and Robinson (2016) tomore systematically evaluate the
current evidence base across three areas—political set-
tlement, sector and organization—to see if different pat-
terns emerge and ifmore fine-grained lessons for specific
contexts can be found. To do this, we reviewed 44 case
studies and compared themacross their political context,
sector and organisation.
The approach used to select this sample of case stud-
ieswas based on identifying experts through the authors’
professional networks and through the TWP Community
of Practice mailing list, who were asked to provide rel-
evant case studies. This was further supplemented by
searching Google and Google Scholar using various com-
binations of relevant keywords5. The sample was limited
to studies that look at development practice through a
lens or framework where TWP is a central part of the
analysis, strategy, partnerships or design. It is not limited
to a particular definition of TWP or focused only on a par-
1 Pycroft also refers to ‘acting politically’ to differentiate between activities with a specifically political objective and ‘working politically’, as described
here. Carothers and de Gramont (2013) talk about ‘thinking and acting politically’. For whatever reason, this distinction—which is important—does not
seem to have been picked up in the wider literature.
2 For useful discussions of the similarities and differences between these various initiatives, see Parks (2016) and Green (2016).
3 See Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice (n.d.). The authors of this article have all played some role in the TWP Community of Prac-
tice and associated groups, albeit with varying degrees of formal involvement. Heather Marquette and Mark Robinson were founding members, and
Heather was the Community’s Secretary from 2013 until 2018. She remains a member of the steering committee. In 2017–18, Ed Laws was appointed
as a Research Fellow to undertake research and analysis for the Community of Practice. Some of the work he undertook during the fellowship has
contributed to this article. Niheer Dasandi has not had a formal role with the Community but has been a participant in several workshops.
4 While the DDD website no longer exists, details can be found on ODI and Building State Capability websites. See, for example, Building State Capability
(2014) and DDD Manifesto (n.d.).
5 While not a systematic review, we tried to be as systematic in our approach as possible. We used keyword terms and Boolean operators, as well as UK
and US/Australian spelling. These search strings included, for example: ‘TWP’ AND ‘development’ OR ‘aid’ OR ‘donor’ OR ‘programme’ OR ‘program-
ming’ OR ‘program’; ‘thinking and working politically’; ‘thinking and working politically’ AND ‘development’ OR ‘aid’ OR ‘donor’; ‘politically-informed’
AND ‘programme’ OR ‘programming’ OR ‘program’; ‘politically-smart’ AND ‘programme’ OR ‘programming’ OR ‘program’ OR ‘donor’ OR ‘development’;
‘adaptive’ AND ‘management’ OR ‘programming’ OR ‘program’ OR ‘aid’ OR ‘donor’ OR ‘development’; ‘political economy’ AND ‘donor’; OR ‘aid’ OR ‘de-
velopment’; political economy analysis’; ‘PEA’; ‘PDIA’; ‘doing development differently’; ‘DDD’.
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ticular approach and takes authors who self-identify as
writing about TWP (or, in some cases, ‘adaptive manage-
ment’) at face value. From the sampling, a database of
available case studies was created (see Appendix).6 In ad-
dition to these cases, we also refer to more conceptual
literature, as well as conversations that have taken place
through blogs and online commentary. This is important
for trying to understand what is, as we discuss, in many
ways an ongoing conversation rather than an attempt at
producing a rigorous evidence exercise.
It is important to note that in limiting our sample of
studies that have an explicit TWP focus, our analysis does
not consider studies that in fact do fit descriptions of
‘TWP’, but donot self-identify as ‘TWP’. Such studies have
not been included due to time and budget constraints.
In this same vein, we are not reviewing case studies on
the effectiveness of public sector reforms and/or devel-
opment interventions in general, whichwould bewell be-
yond the scope of this article. Therefore, our claims re-
garding the state of the evidence should be understood
to refer to the literature that makes a direct link to TWP
rather than the wider literature on development pro-
grammes that include elements of politically informed
practice, but do not explicitly label them as such. Having
said this, given that the studies included in our sample
have an explicit focus on TWP, we would expect these
to provide the strongest evidence on how TWP impacts
aid effectiveness. Furthermore, as the cumulative knowl-
edge produced by TWP ‘identifiers’ is clearly influencing
development practice, trying to understand the strength
of this particular evidence base remains important.
Much has been written about how prevailing organ-
isational cultures, incentives and structures in most de-
velopment agencies, as well as political pressure from
ministers, continue to pose significant obstacles to the
implementation of more politically informed develop-
ment work (Carothers & De Gramont, 2013; Unsworth,
2015; Yanguas, 2018; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Our argu-
ment here is not that these obstacles are directly linked
to a lack of evidence, or even that a stronger evidence
base will, by itself, overcome these obstacles. However,
a stronger evidence base that demonstrates clearly and
robustly that TWP contributes to more effective devel-
opment practice and, importantly, improved outcomes
would certainly strengthen the case for donors to adopt
more politically informed, adaptive approaches to de-
velopment assistance, and as such could contribute to
efforts to overcome these challenges. Our analysis sug-
gests, however, that this strong evidence base does not
yet exist.
2. What Does the Evidence Base Currently Look Like?
In this section, we examine the evidence base on TWP.
We begin by discussing the factors identified in the ex-
isting studies as contributing to increased aid effective-
ness. We then map out the evidence base on TWP. To do
this, we utilise the framework proposed by Dasandi et al.
(2016) that involves three levels of analysis: 1) the wider
political context of development interventions—how the
political system, leadership and the nature of the politi-
cal settlement in a given context affect development pro-
grammes; 2) the sectoral level—how characteristics of
specific sectors (e.g. health, education, or water deliv-
ery) influence programme implementation and impact;
and 3) the organisational level—how features of an im-
plementing organisation can support or hinder politically
informed programming. In each section below, we pro-
vide an overview of the level of analysis and the overall
evidence base within that, as well as an illustrative exam-
ple of a programme that reflects that particular level of
analysis. These cases were chosen as ‘typical’ examples
to illustrate the wider body of literature (Gerring, 2008).
Of course, this approach has limitations; as Seawright
and Gerring (2008, p. 294) explain: ‘the chosen case is
asked to perform a heroic role: to stand for (represent)
a population of cases that is often much larger than the
case itself’. This is not, however, untypical in small-N sam-
ples, and we would not claim that the illustrative cases
are somehow representative of the wider reform liter-
ature. They are, however, fairly representative of the
much more limited sample of TWP case studies, the sub-
ject of this article.
Although TWP is not a formal method or operational
model, the literature highlights several recurring fac-
tors that are said to contribute to the success of more
politically-informed programmes. Common success fac-
tors flagged by the authors are:
• Leaders were politically smart and could use that
knowledge effectively;
• Programme managers allowed local actors to take
the lead;
• The programmes adopted an ‘iterative problem
solving, stepwise learning’ process;
• Programme staff brokered relationships with ma-
jor interest groups;
• Donors provided flexible and strategic funding;
• Therewas a long-term commitment by donors and
high level of continuity in staffing;
• There was a supportive environment in the donor
agency.
Each of the factors listed above maps onto what are said
to be corresponding weaknesses in more conventional
programming approaches. For example, the imperative
to be ‘politically smart’ contrasts with what is seen as
the failings of ‘politically blind’ approaches to develop-
ment. Similarly, the importance of local ownership is a re-
sponse to problems that have been seen to emerge from
development initiatives largely driven by external actors.
We discuss these factors in more detail below.
6 The full list of programmes can be found in Laws and Marquette (2018, pp. 37–38). We have also included a table that provides an overview of the 44
studies in the Appendix to this article.
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Each of the case studies that we identified included
a selection of the above factors in their explanation for
the programme’s success, albeit sometimes in different
combinations and with differing emphasis. It is, however,
also important to note that these are the factors that
were identified in Booth and Unsworth’s (2014) influen-
tial article looking at seven cases of successful donor-led
interventions. Given, as we discuss below, that these pro-
grammes cut across different political contexts, sectors
and organisations, an important question that arises is
whether these factors are actually the most important
elements of the programme success that is claimed to
the exclusion of other aspects, or whether these fac-
tors have been identified because Booth and Unsworth’s
(2014) article has been so influential that authors are
now primed to look out for and emphasise the same
features when evaluating programme success. In other
words, does the literature suffer from ‘confirmation bias’,
which means that it draws lessons only from cases that
fit a pre-existing notion of what factors lead to more
successful programme implementation and outcomes
(Dasandi et al., 2016, p. 6)?7
One of our initial aims in compiling a database of
TWP case studies was to identify patterns in the success
factors across programmes, across the three different
levels (political context, sector, and organisation). This
was based on the expectation that different combina-
tions of the recurring factors identified in the literature
would be required to improve programme effectiveness
in different contexts and sectors (Hudson & Marquette,
2015, p. 74). For example, we might expect that success-
fully incorporating politics and adaptive practice into pro-
grammedesign and implementation in the justice and se-
curity sector in a fragile and conflict-affected statemeans
something quite different than in, say, a sanitation pro-
gramme in a relatively stable country. However, our re-
view of the current literature found little in the way of
guidance on how and why different aspects of TWP may
be necessary and sufficient conditions for success in dif-
ferent scenarios. Furthermore, we found little discussion
of whether and how some factors or approaches may be
inappropriate in certain contexts.
This is a significant issue, because if TWP is at its heart
about illuminating contextual differences in order to
move away from ‘cookie cutter’ best practice approaches
(cf. Levy, 2014), then we would expect to see variations
in programme design, implementation and outcomes.
However, while different case studies have been pub-
lished since Booth and Unsworth’s comparative study,
there is very little, if any, variation between them along
these factors. Indeed, given the similarities highlighted
below, it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to discern if
the patterns that are beginning to emerge from compar-
ing the various cases genuinely reflect an emerging con-
sensus or if, in fact, it reflects growing ‘group think’ about
the necessary programme design characteristics among
TWP insiders. Given the lack of discernible difference in
the factors identified in the existing literature across the
different levels, our discussion of each level focuses on
the nature of the evidence in each of these areas, and
on providing examples of the types of studies that exist.
2.1. Political Context
There are different ways to distinguish and analyse the
political context in which development interventions
take place, such as by reference to the political regime,
the nature of political and bureaucratic leadership and
interaction, or power structures such as gender, religion,
ethnicity, caste and rural-urban divides. Here, we focus
on the political settlement in a country to identify the dif-
ferent political contexts in which TWP programmes have
been carried out. Political settlements analysis focuses
on the power and incentives that shape the actions of
key decision makers (Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2018; Laws &
Leftwich, 2014). As such, it can enable development prac-
titioners to distinguish meaningfully between different
country contexts by identifying the kinds of issue areas,
programming approaches, and potential partners with
whom they are likely to have traction (Kelsall, 2018). Fur-
thermore, the political settlements approach is closely
related to the turn to TWP among donors (see Carothers
& de Gramont, 2013).
Political settlements have been defined as:
Informal and formal processes, agreements, and prac-
tices in a society that help consolidate politics, rather
than violence, as a means for dealing with disagree-
ments about interests, ideas and the distribution and
use of power. (Laws & Leftwich, 2014, p. 1)
Several typologies have been put forward to identify
different types of political settlement. Synthesizing a
range of approaches, Kelsall (2016) identifies three par-
ticularly common forms: (i) developmental (ii) preda-
tory and (iii) hybrid. While these are ideal types, they
identify a broad range of features that enable states
to be categorised according to settlement type. Devel-
opmental states are characterised by an inclusive set-
tlement, a high degree of coordination amongst elites
and a bureaucracy that operates on largely impersonal
norms. Predatory settlements tend to have exclusive set-
tlements, spoils-driven elites and a bureaucracywith per-
vasive patron-client relations. Hybrid settlements sit be-
tween the two; there is a significant degree of inclusion
and political contestation is for the most part peaceful,
but some elites are excluded and actors may be willing
to use political violence. Similarly, some elites are coor-
dinated while others are spoils-driven, and the norms
within the bureaucracy vary between elements of pa-
tronage and high-functioning ‘pockets’ that are largely
rule-based (Wales, Magee, & Nicolai, 2016, p. 13).
7 One expert we consulted flagged that the extent to which these features may be objectively verified is another challenge. What defines a politically
smart or a politically unsmart leader, for example?
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The existing case studies on TWP programmes are
heavily weighted towards countries with hybrid politi-
cal settlements (see Figure 1). This is perhaps to be ex-
pected, given that, as Kelsall (2016) points out, most
countries in the developing world will have settlements
of this kind, rather than exhibiting the characteristics at
the other ends of the settlement spectrum (developmen-
tal or predatory). Apart from a report on the Strategic Ca-
pacity Building Initiative in Rwanda (AGI, n.d.), there are
no studies on how TWP programmes have operated in
political contexts characterised by developmental politi-
cal settlements. Given that inclusive, coordinated, devel-
opmental states are highly rare in the developing world,
this is not particularly surprising.
One example from a hybrid political settlement is
the Enabling State Programme (ESP) in Nepal, a 13-year,
DFID-supported programme with a budget of £33m. It
sought to address issues of weak governance and social
and political exclusion that research had identified as un-
derlying causes of conflict and poor development out-
comes. Booth and Unsworth (2014, p. 11) refer to a se-
ries of independent evaluations that point to ESP having
been a major player in helping to shift the ‘rules of the
game’ in the direction of greater social and political in-
clusion, as well as achieving more specific, quantifiable
results. Specific examples of ESP impact cited include
piloting of single treasury accounts in 38 districts (now
rolled out in all 75 districts); support for the Public Ser-
vice Commission that contributed tomodest but positive
increases in appointments of women and other excluded
groups; and provision of disaggregated data and other ev-
idence to the National Planning Commission.
During the lifespan of the programme the DFID office
in Nepal is said to have taken considerable effort to be-
come involved in and informed about local politics. This
involved analysis of the underlying causes of the conflict
dynamics that were unfolding at the time, including the
political, economic, gender and ethnic dimensions and
the impact of DFID programming. This research helped
to refocus the work of the ESP team away from good
governance and towards the critical conflict issues. In ad-
dition to this research and analysis, the team was able
to recruit several well-informed, well-networked elite
Nepali staff; the authors argue that these staff were not
only politically well-informed but also skillful in navigat-
ing a charged political environment and in seizing op-
portunities to advance programme objectives (Booth &
Unsworth, 2014).
Predatory, exclusive, spoils-driven settlements are
the second most common context in which TWP
programmes have been studied. Trying to think and
work in more politically engaged, experimental or en-
trepreneurial ways may be particularly appropriate for
interventions in these kinds of challenging political con-
texts, given the uncertain change processes at play
and the lack of prior accumulated evidence on what
works (Wild, Booth, & Valters, 2017). However, preda-
tory settlements do not necessarily overlap with fragile
or conflict-affected states, and a closer look at the spread
of the evidence indicates a notable gap here in terms of
TWP case studies. Of the 44 programmes that we iden-
tified as being the subject of TWP research, only seven
are based exclusively in countries that are featured on
the World Bank’s most recent Harmonised List of Frag-
ile Situations. Given the growing concentration of aid
from major donors, including DFID and the World Bank,
in fragile and conflict-affected states, a greater emphasis
of TWP research efforts in violent and unstable political
contexts would seem to be important given the untested
nature of these ways of working. In addition, given the
argument found in many of the case studies—as in the
ESP one above—that effective programmes require po-
litically well-connected staff, there has been surprisingly
little analysis about how these staff are recruited, how
their activities are assessed or what this may mean in
practice in politically divided societies.
2.2. Sector
The conditions for successful programme implementa-
tion are also likely to vary according to the sector in ques-
tion. This is because different sectors have specific char-
acteristics that determine their political salience, the in-
centives for politicians to deliver them, the main actors
and interests surrounding them and the ways that cit-
izens can mobilise around them. In particular, the ex-
tent to which a particular sector or service is targetable,
‘visible’, measurable and easily credited affects the like-
Figure 1. Case studies grouped according to political settlement type.
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lihood that states will be responsive to efforts to re-
form it (Batley & Mcloughlin, 2015). For example, a
state may have strong incentives for inclusive provision
where a particular service or good has historically been
a key source of state legitimacy and an expression of
the social contract. Therefore, it seems reasonable to ex-
pect that programmes successfully designed and imple-
mented with a close consideration of political dynamics
would need to be aware of and responsive to the political
characteristics of the sector in question.
TWP is associated closely with the governance sec-
tor, to the extent that some authors suggest that it might
be trapped in a ‘governance-ghetto’ (Green, 2017; see
also Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). Our analysis of the evi-
dence confirms that governance is themost heavily stud-
ied sector in the TWP field by a considerable measure
(see Figure 2). One example is the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (DFAT)-funded Governance for Growth
(GfG) programme, which has been supporting economic
governance and public financial management (PFM) re-
forms in Vanuatu for the past decade. The programme
has run over two phases at a cost of around AUD90 mil-
lion over the first nine years. GfG has been able to sup-
port reforms in several different areas. Flagship changes
such as the liberalisation of the telecommunications in-
dustry have been accompanied by important reforms in
areas such as wharfmanagement, fiscal decentralisation,
school capitation grants and taxation.
According to a review by Hadley and Tilley (2017),
GfG has been able to support these reforms by work-
ing politically, a core part of which has involved building
close relationshipswith senior andmid-level bureaucrats
in government. Many features of GfG aim to encourage
close working partnerships between the GfG team and
their counterparts in Vanuatu, with an office co-located
in the Office of the Prime Minister. In Vanuatu, there are
factors which are said to make this aspect of the initia-
tive especially important. Individuals’ relationships are
shaped by local hierarchies and ties to family and place.
Public institutions are often dominated by a particular is-
land or church groupwith shared values,while status and
kinship ties overlap with politics and public administra-
tion. This makes informal systems extremely important
in the flow of knowledge, information and decisions (Cox
et al., 2007). Building trust across groups and bridging
these formal and informal systems is therefore believed
to be central to supporting change in Vanuatu’s public
sector (Hadley & Tilley, 2017).
In terms of the overall evidence base, there are indi-
vidual studies that are spread across a very wide range of
other sectors: justice and security, conflict resolution, in-
frastructure, gender equality, reform coalitions, PFM, in-
vestment, health, community policing, rural livelihoods,
economic development, legislative reform, private sec-
tor development, state capacity, human development,
water, human resources, knowledge sector, solid waste
management, forestry, agriculture, and service delivery.
This supports the argument made by Rocha Menocal
(2014) that TWP is not simply a governance solution to
be applied to a narrow set of institutional issues, because
incentives and power dynamics lie at the centre of most
development challenges. TWP suggests principles for im-
proving the delivery of any aid programme that involves
reform and behavioural change; therefore, it should be
as relevant in principle to the better delivery of health
services or economic policy reform as it is to human de-
velopment or water services.
While the growing breadth of individual TWP stud-
ies across a wide range of sectors is encouraging, our
review found that governance, security and justice and
infrastructure are the only sectors which have been the
subject of three or more case studies. In addition, with
few exceptions, the programmes that have been writ-
ten up into case studies are all reform programmes. It
Figure 2. Case studies grouped according to sector.
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may be that the conclusion we can draw from the evi-
dence base is that TWP might look similar, in terms of
programme design, for reform programmes, regardless
of sector; whether or not that is useful for someone try-
ing to design an infrastructure programme, or a service
delivery one, is not clear. It is therefore not possible to
draw robust conclusions about how development pro-
grammes can think and work politically in an effective
way in a particular sector without a deeper and stronger
evidence base to draw upon. This would require a larger
body of studies that look at a number of different pro-
gramming approaches in the same sector, as well as stud-
ies looking at similar kinds of programmes in different
sectors (Dasandi et al., 2016).
2.3. Organisation
The third level of analysis focuses on the organisations
involved in the design and implementation of TWP pro-
grammes. This includes external actors (the bilateral or
multilateral donors or international NGOs [INGOs] which
are usually responsible for funding and programme
design) and domestic partners (the government agen-
cies and local NGOs which are typically responsible
for programme implementation and aspects of design)
(Dasandi et al., 2016, p. 11).
Certain kinds of organisational characteristics are
claimed by the literature to be closely associated with
successful TWP. For example, the TWP literature calls
for organisations—and individuals within these—that
can solve problems and search for workable solutions
through iterative learning, can broker relationships with
key stakeholders in a specific programme area and are
prepared to experiment with flexible and strategic fund-
ing modalities (Booth & Unsworth, 2014; Dasandi et al.,
2016). Ideally, it is argued that organisations need to
have processes in place that encourage this kind of ex-
perimentation, innovation and learning, along with a
bureaucratic and managerial culture that supports staff
in operating along these lines (Bain, Booth, & Wild,
2016, p. 35).
For example, in 2012 DFAT and the Asia Foundation
(TAF) began work under a strategic partnership agree-
ment which included a range of reform initiatives that
aimed to work politically in practice. In Bangladesh, the
team worked with local partners to support efforts to
move leather tanneries out of a dangerously polluted lo-
cation to a modern industrial park. The goal was to im-
prove compliance with health and environmental protec-
tion standards and potentially lead to growth in the sec-
tor. A reform coalition supported by TAF is said to have
contributed significantly to expediting the relocation pro-
cess, with figures issued in 2015 indicating that of the
155 tanneries allocated plots at the new estate, 148 had
begun substantive construction.
As detailed in an ODI case study (Harris, 2016), this
initiative used structured learning to iterate and adapt
over the course of implementation. This involved both
regular reflective discussions as part of an approach
called ‘strategy testing’ (Ladner, 2015), along with day-
to-day, ad-hoc adjustments. Strategy testing offered op-
portunities for discussion within the team across all lev-
els of seniority, and prompted staff to regularly consider
how changes in the reform context might affect their
strategy. The team reported that the strategy testing ses-
sions provided an opportunity for them to take stock
of recent events and actions. It also offered an oppor-
tunity to update documentation to reflect changes in
the program and thereby provide a record of decision-
making for donor accountability purposes (Harris, 2016).
Micro-adjustments were also made on an on-going ba-
sis through problem solving and informally reflecting on
tactics, which was encouraged by the initiative’s culture.
The literature on TWP programmes focuses primar-
ily on the role of bilateral and multilateral donors (see
Figure 3). For the most part, the agencies examined
are DFID, DFAT and the World Bank. Given that these
donors fund a significant amount of the research that
constitutes the TWP literature, this bias is not surprising,
but strengthening the evidence for TWP will require re-
searchers to look at a wider range of organisations and
agents engaged in programming (Dasandi et al., 2016).
There is a lack of research looking at the demands that
TWP places on the internal systems, capabilities and
incentive structures of the organisations implementing
programmes on the ground—whether domestic or in-
ternational NGOs, commercial service providers or do-
mestic government agencies. The small number of docu-
mented cases that do focus on the experience of the im-
plementing organisationmostly center on one INGO, the
TAF, some of which were produced in collaboration with
ODI, including the Bangladesh study discussed above
(Denney, 2016; Faustino & Booth, 2014; Harris, 2016;
Valters, 2016). Excluding one report looking at the work
of Peace Direct and Centre Résolution Conflicts in the
DRC (Gillhespy & Hayman, 2011), there appear to be no
TWP studies that focus on cases where an INGO is the
external funding organisation and a local NGO is the im-
plementing partner. Finally, there are no cases at all in
the sampled literature that look specifically at the experi-
ence of domestic government agencies in implementing
TWP programmes with external donor support.
Amore detailed insight into the internal processes in-
volved in TWP in donor agencies is put forward in a collec-
tion of essays in Fritz, Levy and Ort (2014), which looks at
the implementation of PEA in eight World Bank country
programmes. These studies demonstrate how the find-
ings and recommendations from political analysis were
taken on board by different programmes and used in
operational practice. As such, they provide an insight
into some of the micro-level processes involved in TWP
within the donor organisation and country teams. How-
ever, these studies are weaker on demonstrating how
the implementation of the insights fromPEA led to better
outcomes or more successful programming decisions.
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Figure 3. Case studies grouped according to organization.
3. Is There a ‘Good Enough’ Evidence Base on TWP and
Aid Effectiveness?
Leading on from this, in addition to the content gaps
that have been noted above, there are also important
methodological limitations in the literature. These gaps
and limitations mean that, while there are certainly in-
teresting and engaging case studies, they do not consti-
tute the kind of ‘rigorous-enough’ evidence base that is
needed to support more ambitious causal and predictive
claims about the role of TWP in improving aid effective-
ness and securing better development outcomes, includ-
ing in fragile environments.
With a few exceptions the case studies reviewed fall
short of the high standards on transparency, validity, reli-
ability and cogency that one would expect in a strong ev-
idence base (DFID, 2014). The literature continues to be
almost entirely made up of single programme case stud-
ies, with few attempts at comparison, and written for
the most part by programme insiders. There have been
recent improvements in terms of transparency on meth-
ods, most notably Denney (2016), Denney and McLaren
(2016), Hadley and Tilley (2017), Harris (2016) and Lucia,
Buckley,Marquette andMcCulloch (2017, in press). How-
ever, even these rely largely on interviews and docu-
mentary analysis, or a form of action research, rather
than methods more appropriate for establishing causal
explanations. Moreover, approaches to triangulation are
often unclear or entirely absent. Subsequently, in the
case studies reviewed, it is often hard to discern a direct
causal relationship between TWP and the outcomes that
were said to have been achieved.
Only one study in our sample (Booth, 2014) considers
counterfactuals and very few discuss challenges faced
in the programmes or areas that were unsuccessful (no-
table exceptions include Denney and Maclaren (2016),
Hadley and Tilley (2017) and Lucia et al. (2017, in press).
A more balanced approach would look to highlight ar-
eas where TWP has failed to achieve positive results or
to achieve the results that were intended. The fact that
this is uncommon in the case studies reviewed may be,
at least in part, because many TWP case studies have
beenwritten up either by funders themselves or by other
actors who have been involved in evaluating the pro-
gramme as part of its implementation.8
This also means that there are limitations of the ex-
isting literature in terms of its theory-building rather
than theory-testing potential. As we have discussed, the
TWP literature identifies several factors that are seen as
improving the effectiveness of politically-informed pro-
grammes, such as programme managers allowing local
actors to take the lead and programme staff brokering re-
lationships with major interest groups. However, beyond
fairly broad discussions, there is a lack of in-depth analy-
sis of how, and importantly when, these factors lead to
improved outcomes. For example, programme staff bro-
kering relationships with major interest groups by itself
will not enable programme staff to address opposition
to change by these groups or contestation among these
different interest groups. As such, there is also a need
for more attention to causal mechanisms that connect
the factors identified in the literature with increased aid
effectiveness. This would be helped by greater engage-
ment with some of the more general literature on the
politics of reform processes (e.g. Ascher, 1984; Grindle,
2004). In part, this again would be helped by greater en-
gagementwith programmes that have adopted elements
of TWP but failed to achieve positive results.
This would seem to be particularly relevant to TWP,
which emphasises the need to test theories of change
8 This also raises more serious questions about the potential for conflicts of interest to arise in ‘insider’ driven research, especially where potential
commercial benefits exist, something that has not yet been sufficiently addressed.
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and adapt projects and programmes in light of some ac-
tivities failing. Indeed, studies rarely focus on outcomes,
instead focusing on the reform and/or programming pro-
cess instead. Few studies discuss their criteria for ‘suc-
cess’, including what the relevant metrics used are. All
of this raises concerns about quality, which can often
be ameliorated by publishing in well regarded, peer re-
viewed journals as a proxy for quality. However, to the
best of our knowledge, only one of the case studies has
been published in a peer reviewed journal (Lucia et al.,
in press). While one might expect a healthy balance be-
tween organizational working papers and journal articles
in such a practice-oriented area, the lack of journal ar-
ticles is a concern, especially when combined with the
other points raised here.
4. Conclusions
This article has looked at the existing evidence base for
TWP with the aim of providing guidance for future re-
search into what works, where and why in terms of TWP
programming. In short, we find that while there are cer-
tainly interesting and engaging case studies in the litera-
ture, these do not yet constitute a ‘strong enough’ ev-
idence base that proves that TWP has significantly im-
proved aid effectiveness. Since TWP is a relatively re-
cent arrival in the development debate, gaps in the liter-
ature are to be expected. Additionally, the primary func-
tion of TWP may not in fact be aid effectiveness per se,
but rather avoiding the well recorded pitfalls and neg-
ative unintended consequences of ‘politically blind’ aid
(Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). But given the rising in-
terest in developing more politically informed, flexible
and adaptive programming, and claims that case study
authors themselves make about improved effectiveness,
this should be an urgent priority for funders. In addition,
if one intention is to avoid the well documented conse-
quences of ‘politically blind’ aid, the potential for unin-
tended consequences to emerge from TWP ‘approaches’,
such as relying on politically well-connected insiders,
should be another urgent priority.
We suggest that—if our overall aim is to understand
the effect of TWPon aid effectiveness—weneed tomove
beyond descriptions of what are, in effect, programme
designs and activities. The analysis here suggests that if
we are to determine if TWP leads to greater aid effec-
tiveness, future research should consider more rigorous
and structured testing of what works, where, why and
how. Ideally, this would happen while this sort of pro-
gramming is still relatively ‘niche’ and where it does not
yet make up a significant percentage of donor funding.
Developing a better understanding of the approaches
and strategies that work well in different political, sec-
toral and organisational contexts will be an important
step if TWP, and its variants such as adaptive manage-
ment, are going to move into more mainstream develop-
ment programming. Looking at programmes in a broader
range of political contexts, including in contexts that are
fragile and conflict-affected, where a focus on potential
unintended consequences—including from the program-
ming approach used—and on the trade-offs and dilem-
mas that development organisations face, may be partic-
ularly salient in terms of engaging with the political pro-
cess of development (see Dasandi & Erez, 2017).
By systematically comparing a broader range of pro-
grammes in different sectors and organisational con-
texts, the field may be able to draw firmer lessons about
programme implementation and outcomes in different
situations, testing some of the common assumptions
aboutwhatworks. Thiswill help to demonstratewhether
there are general lessons about when, why, and how dif-
ferent factors identified in TWP literature lead to pro-
gramme success or failure. This may, in turn, help the
field move towards a clearer understanding of the con-
straints that can hinder more political ways of working
and to explore where and how these barriers have oc-
curred in the context of specific strategies, programmes
or country offices. Comparative analysis could then be
used to test assumptions and draw out lessons about
how actors have or have not been able to navigate
around them in different contexts.
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Appendix. List of case studies.
Programme Donor/lead organisation Country
Australia–Timor-Leste Partnership DFAT Timor-Leste
for Human Development
Budget Strengthening Initiative DFID, AusAID, DANIDA, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
World Bank Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda,
the Secretariat of the g7+ based
in Timor-Leste
Centre for Inclusive Growth DFID Nepal
Coalitions for Change DFAT-TAF Philippines
Community Dispute Resolution TAF Philippines
Community Dispute Resolution TAF, Hewlett Foundation Nepal
& later USAID
Community Dispute Resolution TAF Sri Lanka
Community Policing TAF, DFID & BHC Sri Lanka
Community Policing TAF Timor-Leste
Developing Commercical Agriculture World Bank Ghana
Disarmament, Demobilisation Peace Direct DRC
and Reintegration in DRC
Empowerment, Voice and Accountability DFID Pakistan
for Better Health and Nutrition
Energy Subsidy Reform World Bank Morocco
EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance EU, DFID Asia, Africa, Central and South America
and Trade Action Plan
Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform DFID Nigeria
Governance for Development DFAT Timor-Leste
Governance for Growth DFAT Indonesia
Governance for Growth in Vanuatu DFAT Vanuatu
Health sector quality improvement projects Multiple donors Ghana, Ethiopia
(‘basket’ case study)
Infrastructure Reform World Bank Sierra Leone
Infrastructure Reform World Bank Zambia
Knowledge Sector Initiative DFAT/Government Indonesia
of Indonesia
Leather Sector Initiative DFAT, TAF Bangladesh
Legal Assistance for Economic Reform DFID Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somaliland,
Uganda, Bangladesh, Burma, Tanzania
Local government development programmes UNCDF Uganda
(‘basket’ case study)
Local Infrastructure in Papua New Guinea World Bank PNG
Pacific Leadership Program DFAT Pacific region with a focus on Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu
Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development DFAT Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Tonga
Papua New Guinea Governance Facility DFAT PNG
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Programme Donor/lead organisation Country
Pay and Attendance Monitoring Programme DFID, Global Fund Sierra Leone
Private Sector Development DFID DRC
Pyoe Pin DFID, SIDA, DANIDA Myanmar
Reforming Solid Waste Management DFAT/TAF Cambodia
Rural Water and Accountability Programme DFID, SNV Netherlands Tanzania
Development Organisation
Shifting Incentives in the Power Sector World Bank Dominican Republic
State Accountability and Voice Initiative DFID Nigeria
State Partnership for Accountability, DFID Nigeria
Responsiveness and Capability
Strategic Capacity Building Initiative UNDP, World Bank Rwanda
Strategy and Policy Unit Various private foundations Sierra Leone
and institutional donors
Strengthening Local Service Delivery in World Bank Philippines
the Philippines
The Enabling State Programme DFID Nepal
Voices for Change DFID Nigeria
Western Odisha Rural Livelihoods Programme DFID India
World Bank Country Assistance Strategy World Bank Mongolia
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